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Abstract
I claim that Objective Consequentialism (OC) faces a problem stemming from the exis-
tence in some situations of a plurality of chances relevant to the outcomes of an agent’s acts.
I suggest that this phenomenon bears structural resemblance to the well-known Reference
Class problem. I outline a few ways in which one could attempt to deal with the issue, sug-
gesting that it is the higher-level chance that should be employed by OC.
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1. Introduction
Objective Consequentialism (OC), the approach to ethics according to which ’the primary no-
tion for moral theory is given by what is best (or (...) has greatest objective value) regardless of
how things seem to the agent’ (Oddie &Menzies, 1992, p. 512) and ’the correct regulative ideal
for the moral agent is that of maximising objective value’ (ibid., p. 513), has been criticised
in a number of familiar ways. Perhaps the best point of departure is (Lenman, 2000), where
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probably the most immediate objection to the OC, stemming from the obvious intuition about
the difficulty of predicting the future, is discussed. In this paper I will present what I believe to
be a hitherto overlooked problem the OC needs to face. It is somewhat similar in spirit to that
posed by situations in which ’there is no fact of the matter about whether things will turn out
well or badly if we do one thing or another’ (Hare, 2011, p. 199); however, in the cases described
below it seems there are too many relevant facts, pulling our ethical reasoning in conflicting
directions.
The main idea I want to propose is that the objective variant of consequentialism faces an
issue which is somewhat structurally similar to the well-known reference class problem, and
that to this issue no clearly best solution presents itself. In a nutshell, one reading of the
classical reference class problem takes it to be generated by the fact that an individual can
be classified as belonging to various sets, and so where one is looking for a single probability
value one finds a multitude of them instead. Modern philosophy of science takes seriously
the idea of chance plurality, that is, that some propositions have, at a fixed moment in a fixed
world, more than one chance value. In situations displaying chance plurality, one and the same
proposition may have various chances – fundamental and higher-level ones. This might lead
to objective consequentialism imposing contradictory obligations on some agents in some sit-
uations. While in my opinion accepting this should be seriously considered, I will suggest that
the right version of objective consequentialism should lead to obligations based on higher-level
chances. However, the argument for this requires some assumptions unacceptable to a pure
conseqentialist. In effect, I argue that the right version of objective consequentialism needs to
be ’impure’ in the sense that it should require one to care about more than just maximizing a
value function. In my opinion pure objective consequentialism has no way out of the problems
raised by chance plurality.
In what follows I will only be talking about act consequentialism. It is quite possible that
similar issues also arise for rule consequentialism, but the matter is not entirely clear to me
yet and I plan to explore this in a later paper.
2. The Gist of Objective Consequentialism
The main idea behind act consequentialism is that an act’s moral value stems only from its
consequences as compared to the consequences of the other acts available to the agent; some
way of evaluating the consequences needs of course to be assumed. There are at least two lines
dividing the field of consequentialist approaches. One demarcates those according to which
what matters are the act’s real consequences from those which take into account consequences
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considered from at least partially subjective point of view – for example, consequences which
can be rationally predicted. This is the division between objective and subjective families of
consequentialism. Another overarching distinction is that between those approaches which
employ probability when comparing the values of acts – the probabilistic approaches – and
those which do not. The nonprobabilistic approaches are usually subjunctive, if they resort to
would-subjunctive conditionals1 or possibilist, if they use modal accessibility relations coupled
with some possible-world-ranking system2. As already stated, in this paper I am concerned
with objective consequentialism. That its correct form is probabilistic, regardless of whether
the world itself is deterministic or not, has been in my opinion conclusively established by
Vessel (2007). I will be, though, describing a problem such an approach must face; should
the Reader come to the conclusion that the issue is unanswerable properly, they might believe
that it speaks for adopting a non-probabilistic form of consequentialism, or for switching to
subjective consequentialism, or, finally, for moving away from consequentialism altogether.
Any probabilistic consequentialism claims that agents have an obligation to maximise ex-
pected moral utility, that is, to maximise the value of what we will call the ’consequentialist
formula’ (CF for short): ∑
i
Pr(Oi|A j)×V (Oi),
where the Oi ’s are the possible outcomes, V is the consequentialist value function, Pr(X |Y ) is
the probability of X given Y (see below), the A j ’s are the agent’s possible acts, and, to be sure,
maximisation is over the acts A j.3 The act which maximises the formula is what the agent
ought to do in the given situation.
I would like to stress that I am not suggesting objective consequentialism to be a sort of de-
cision procedure; we should take it to be a criterion of rightness (see the beginning of Feldman,
2006, and also Stark, 1997, as well as references therein). We have an obligation to do the right
thing. Consequentialism says that the right thing to do is the one which maximises the CF.
According to the objective variant of consequentialism – which, as I have already mentioned, I
take to be probabilistic in nature – objective chances, which might not be known to the agent,
feature essentially in the CF. Therefore objective consequentialism cannot function as a deci-
1 Subjunctive approaches have been originally employed by G.E. Moore (see for example p. 30 of Moore, 2005) and
by numerous thinkers since (for example Carlson, 1995).
2 See for example Feldman (1975) and chapter 1.3 of Feldman (1986).
3 I am assuming the formula is perfectly understandable for anyone reading about consequentialism, but if one
needs a reference, here is one: (Jackson, 1991). Nothing of relevance for the current paper hangs on whether the
maximum (given the specific formula, that is, after specifying the Pr and V functions, the relevant outcomes and acts)
is unique; I propose we assume it always is, since we can then use the expression ’the right thing to do’. The Reader
will be able to reformulate all that follows without the uniqueness assumption. I will also sometimes write about
’maxi- / minimising the CF’ instead of ’maxi- /minimising the value of the CF’.
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sion procedure; it cannot in general guide agents in their choices. Rather, it specifies the right
act, and by that the agent’s obligation, that is, what the agent ought to do, given the full set of
data about the value function and relevant probabilities. It is therefore fully compatible with
the idea that for some agents on some — if not many, or even most — occasions it is impossible
to know what the right act is. However, this lack of knowledge does not, of course, annul the
obligation to perform that act.
Just like in probability theory and statistics it is normal to say that a random variable has
an expected value even if no subjectivity is involved anywhere, and no person really expects
anything relevant to the topic at hand, the fact that consequentialism involves maximising
expected moral utility does not make it subjective from the start. The division between the
objective and subjective branches of consequentialism also does not hang on the notion of value:
it is assumed that some preference ranking of the possible outcomes is in the background
which allows a sensible numerical representation of the values. Whether consequentialism is
subjective or objective depends, however, on the nature of probabilities involved. If Pr(Oi|A j)
refers to an agent’s opinion as to how likely it is that the given act leads to the given outcome,
or if this probability, while not referring to the agent’s opinion about likelihoods, still depends
on the evidence available to the agent – that is, if the probabilities featuring in the CF are
epistemic in nature – the consequentialism under discussion is subjective. If, on the other
hand, those probabilities are chances, if they do not depend on what anyone thinks, but are
generated by features of the physical world itself, the discussed consequentialism is objective.
In the following sections I will describe a few problems plaguing probabilistic consequentialism,
and most pressingly its objective variant.
The details of the CF and its possible variants will not concern us: in this paper I will not
go through any calculations and my claims are not related to any peculiarities of mathematical
formalism. The important, if trivial, thing to observe at this point is that in a specific situation,
given a sphere of possible acts and values of the possible outcomes, probability is all that
matters: what an agent ought to do depends completely on the probabilities. If the probabilities
are not well defined, then consequentialism encounters a problem.
3. The Reference Class Problem
The reference class problem raises its head whenever we would like to practically apply proba-
bility. It seems that historically the most persuasive examples of the issue involved predictions
concerning personal well-being. Suppose you’re a higher-educated American Caucasian female
aged 35 living in Boston. You are ill and in need of a cure. There are two drugs for your illness,
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A and B, of which you can only take one. You would like to decide which of the two drugs to
take. If you wish to base your decision on the fact which drug offers you the higher chance of
recovery, what kind of statistical information should you defer to? If ’better among X’ means
just ’offers a higher chance of recovery for members of X’, it might very well happen that drug
A is better than drug B among females, and B is better than A among Caucasians. You may
aim — following e.g. Reichenbach — to refer to the data concerning the narrowest reference
class containing enough people for the relevant frequencies to be considered as probabilities.
However, it is very much possible that there among the classes for which data is available,
there are two maximally narrow ones, in which the probabilities significantly differ: for ex-
ample, drug A may be better than drug B among higher-educated female Caucasians living in
Boston, while drug B may be better than drug A among higher-educated female Caucasians
before 40. Assume that data regarding narrower classes is not available.4 Which class, then,
is the one which determines the probability of interest? Even calling upon the best available
data regarding causal relevance might not be enough to fix a single class.
It is clear why the issue is called the reference class problem: an individual can be correctly
classified as belonging to a number of groups which determine different probabilities of their
possessing a certain trait; if we are interested in the probability that the individual possesses
such a trait, we need to fix a unique reference class. The issue is frequently discussed in the
legal literature, in the context of procedures which demand an estimation of some quantities
on the basis of statistical data, for example the most probable quantity of drugs which was
smuggled by a drug mule during a specified time period, when the mule can be classified as
a drug smuggler caught at the JFK airport, a Nigerian drug smuggler, and in a number of
other nonequivalent ways (Cheng, 2009). General practical solutions to the issue may require
employing concepts outside of the realm of probability and statistics, and talking for example
about mechanisms — for a recent survey of possible approaches see (Wallmann & Williamson,
2017).
Hájek (2007) argues that the problem arises regardless of the probability interpretation we
might adopt: it would seem there should be one, unconditional probability of X , yet what we
can find are different conditional probabilities of X given various propositions. X has differing
probabilities depending on how it is relativized, but none of the conditions to which the rela-
tivization is made presents itself as the right one. I do not want to engage here in the subtleties
of the problem and its proposed solutions, but treat it as an illustration of a more general phe-
nomenon regarding what I’d like to call ’probabilistic definite descriptions’: expressions of the
form ’the probability that X ’. There is nothing abnormal about such expressions; in fact, it
4 I would like to thank one of the Reviewers for suggestions regarding this example.
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is hard to talk about probability without using them. However, the reference class problem
shows that this straightforward talk masks the need for a parameter the value of which has
to be fixed before the expression successfully refers. Insofar as the OC requires the use of ex-
pressions of the sort ‘the probability that act A leads to the outcome O’, it may be beneficial for
its proponents to acknowledge the existence of the problem. However, I do not want to suggest
that it is an issue it would be their job to solve, since, as already mentioned, the problem has
been extensively studied. What I do want to point out is that there is a structurally similar
problem which the OC needs to take seriously, which stems from the phenomenon of chance
plurality, to which we now turn.
4. The plurality of objective chances
One of the topics in philosophy of science which seems to have gained prominence since the
later aughts is that of objective chance and, in particular, whether it makes sense to speak of
non-trivial objective chances in deterministic worlds. One of the most cited papers on the topic
is (Schaffer, 2007). The author argues that determinism and objective chance are incompatible,
first identifying a set of key principles making up the ’role of chance’, that is, the connections
between chance and credence, possibility, causation, and a few further notions. For example,
chance should direct rational credence: if no additional interfering evidence is received, in-
formation that the objective chance of p equals x should fix a rational agent’s credence in p
to x. One important relation between chance and possibility is the fact that non-zero chances
denote possibility: if there is a higher than zero chance that p, then it is possible that p. The
connection with causality concerns chances which are used to explain some transition from a
cause to an effect and restricts the range of temporal affixments of such chances: roughly, they
have to be chances at moments between the time of the cause and the time of effect. Schaffer
formulates in total six substantive principles and proposes that chance is what ’best satisfies’
those principles, as well as some relatively noncontroversial formal conditions (Schaffer, ibid.,
p. 126). He then offers detailed arguments that in a fundamentally deterministic world the
chance functions can obtain only the values 0 and 1; in a deterministic world there are no
non-trivial objective chances.
A number of authors, including for exampleGlynn (2010), Frigg&Hoefer (2015), andEmery
(2015) observed – contrary to Schaffer – that in deterministic setups a non-trivial probability
function can play the role of chance; it seems that it can very well satisfy all the principles iden-
tified by Schaffer, and there would be little point in insisting that it should not be called ’objec-
tive chance’. (Making such a point requires, obviously, switching from talking about chance as
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the unique thing which ’best satisfies’ the above-mentioned set of principles to talking about
chance as one of possibly many things which satisfy those principles maximally well.) The
usual examples depict situations in which a deterministic low-level, or ’micro’, chance function
is accompanied by a non-trivial objective higher-level, or ’macro’, chance function. The point
is, however, generalised for example in (List & Pivato, 2015): both fundamentally determinis-
tic and fundamentally indeterministic worlds can feature both trivial and non-trivial objective
chances at higher levels.
The Reader may be familiar with a popular outlook (probably inspired by Laplace) combin-
ing a fundamental determinism with the belief that any non-trivial probability assignments
stem from our lack of knowledge about the inner workings of the world. Even disregarding
doubts regarding this germinated by post-Newtonian physics, one could think that due to our
cognitive imperfections it is impossible for us to know the whole state of the universe, but it is
that whole state which uniquely determines the universe’s temporal evolution. Any non-trivial
probability assignments are then, supposedly, epistemic in nature, corresponding to this lack of
our knowledge. It needs to be stressed that a sizable part of the modern literature on objective
chance in philosophy of science fromwhich I have cited a few examples above consciously—and,
in my opinion, correctly—negates this outlook: there are objective probabilities, in-the-world
chances, at all levels under discussion.
Another of the principles Schaffer took to be constitutive of the role of chance took it to be
codified by natural laws. Most of the examples familiar from the literature of objective chance
which feature different chances at different levels of description either originally explicitly
feature laws or can be, I think, naturally rephrased so that laws arementioned. As illustrations
of multiple level-relative chances consider the following examples (inspired by Glynn, 2010 and
List & Pivato, 2015, who discuss similar cases, sometimes with more, sometimes with less
detail5):
• diffusion: a rectangular container is filled with water. A portion of a dye is introduced to
the container in one of its corners. We are interested in the chance that after 10 seconds
more than 1 milliliter of the dye will be present in the liquid in the part of the container
defined as being closer than 1 cm to the corner opposite to the one at which the dye was
introduced. The deterministic laws of classical mechanics will give us one value of that
chance, and the statistical laws regarding diffusion will give us another.
• dice: a pair of dice is to be thrown on a gambling table. Suppose that some ’randomising’
apparatus is to be used – for example, the gambler is supposed to push a button turning
5 I am not claiming that the authors would agree with my presentations of the examples. With that said, the
example about Mendelian genetics is lifted almost straight from (Glynn, 2010).
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on on a machine which will rotate a special tube containing the dice (constructed, say,
according to the schematics from the patent application US20110193288A16). What is
the chance that on a particular occasion the gambler is about to throw snake-eyes in
this way? Again, the complete microphysical description of the state of the tube and the
throwing machine coupled with the deterministic laws of classical mechanics dictate one
answer: 1 or 0. However, that same gambling system, being a device for random throws
of two fair dice, admits a higher-level description according to which the chance is 1 in
36.
• genetics: consider two binary plant traits. Suppose two plants are to be crossed which
are heterozygous for each of the two traits. Consider a plant which is the product of this
crossing. What is the chance that this particular plant will be homozygous for both traits?
The laws of Mendelian genetics dictate the answer of 0.25; if the fundamental laws of our
world are deterministic, they either dictate the chance being equal 1 or dictate it being
equal to 0.
• meteorology: suppose the atmosphere of our planet admits a description at the micro-
physical level which is fully deterministic. However, the description of future weather
events meteorologists – and we – are interested in belongs to a higher-level language, in
which predictions are formulated which typically follow from statistical laws. A proposi-
tion concerning such an event, say, that at least one drop of rain falls tomorrow in Mu-
nich, is assigned an objective chance of 0 or 1 by the microphysical laws and a non-trivial
objective chance by the statistical meteorological laws.
A somewhat natural reaction to some of these examples may be to say that it would be
beneficial to apply the crucial distinction between a concrete physical system in a particular
microstate s and a type of systems classified as being in amacrostate S which can be realised by
a multitude of microstates, including s. One could attempt to claim that the two chance func-
tions corresponding to the two levels of descriptions have distinct domains: propositions about
individual systems and propositions about system types. I would like to stress here that this
would be a mistaken route: in the examples given we are talking about two different chances
for the same proposition. Consider a proposition p regarding a future possible observable phe-
nomenon, a trait a particular system can possess, described in a macro-level language. Then,
it is perfectly possible that, for distinct values of x and y, that same physical system is at the
same moment both (1) in a microstate governed by low-level laws which dictate a chance x of
temporal evolution of that system which makes p true, and (2) in a macro state governed by
6 See https://patents.google.com/patent/US20110193288 .
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higher-level laws which dictate a chance y of temporal evolution of that system which makes p
true. That is, there are two distinct chances that p. If this is true for a system and some propo-
sition p, I propose we say that the system exhibits chance plurality. We can sum this up in an
informal definition, availing ourselves of the notions of 1) a physical system, 2) a proposition
which is about a given physical system, and 3) level-relative chances:
Chance plurality. A physical system exhibits chance plurality if and only if there
is a proposition p about it and distinct level-relative chance functions chl and chL
such that chl(p) 6= chL(p).
In such cases it is meaningless to speak of the objective chance that p. Just like in the case
of the reference class problem discussed above, fixing of an additional parameter is needed
before ’the probability that p’ is defined. In the original problem the parameter was, perhaps
obviously, the reference class. Here the parameter is the level of description (of course, spec-
ifying it will not tell us which reference class to use on that level: the previous problem may
still raise its head!). In science the issue is not likely to be of pragmatic relevance since the sci-
entists working in the particular field will be interested in the higher-level laws, the low-level
laws not being practically applicable: the geneticist will use the statistical laws of Mendelian
genetics, the synoptic analyst will use the statistical laws of meteorology, and so on. Still, the
issue is there: in situations of chance plurality, the question ’what is the objective chance that
p?’ does not have an answer.
5. Objective consequentialism and chance plurality
Chance plurality may not be an aggravating problem for scientists, however, it raises an issue
for subscribers to OC. Since the crucial formula CF employs objective chances, it might happen
that it is not well-defined: depending on which level of description is used, different acts may
be right, that is, different oughts might be ascribed to the agent.
To continue the above example involving dice, suppose that John, a gambler, formerly on
a losing streak, has honestly decided in the morning to give all his winnings from that day to
charity. For ease of exposition assume that he plays exclusively at a certain casino and only
takes part in a single game of dice, in which snake-eyes doubles the player’s profit, any other
outcomemeans that the casino takes all, the player can quit after any throw, and the casino can
decide before any throw other than the first that it will be the last one. To his amazement the
machine referred to above – working correctly, as certified by legitimate experts – has thrown
snake-eyes a few times in a row, amassing a sizable sum of money for charity. The machine
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is set, waiting only for a push of the button. The casino decides the next throw will be the
last one, if John decides to take it. Having integrated, in the true consequentialist spirit, any
deliberations regarding risk, the non-linear value of money and so on into the value function,
assume there are three outcomes:
• O1, where the charity receives the money John has earned so far; assume V (O1)= 1;
• O2, where the charity receives twice the money John has earned so far; assume V (O2)=
1.5;7
• O3, where the charity receives nothing;
two acts:
• A1, where John takes the throw (pushes the button);
• A2, where John declines and the game ends;
and two chance functions:
• chm, the micro-level, deterministic chance8, according to which the chance of one outcome
of the throw is 1 and the chance of any other outcome is 0;
• chM , the macro-level chance, according to which the chance of any outcome of a throw of
a fair die is 1 in 6.
Assume that the distribution of microphysical properties in the gambling system is such
that, in fact, if the button is pressed, snake-eyes will be thrown: chm(O2|A1) = 1. The act A2
implies the occurrence of the outcomeO1; therefore, since chances are probability functions, re-
gardless of which level of description is used, the expected moral utility of act A2 is 1. However,
regarding the act A1 the situation is slightly nontrivial. This is because:
• chm(O1|A1)= chm(O3|A1)= 0, while chm(O2|A1)= 1;
• chM(O1|A1)= 0, chM(O2|A1)= 1/36, and chM(O3|A1)= 35/36.
7 For the coming reasoning it will only be needed that V (O2) is not outlandishly – say, 36 times or more – higher
than V (O1).
8 As one Reviewer pointed out, significant doubts can be raised whether the assumption of fundamental determin-
ism of the gambling machine is compatible with John making an undetermined choice. My idea was that the setup
described would suggest that we could speak, in the case under discussion, of a probabilistic nomological machine in
the sense of Cartwright (1999). But more importantly, please note that the assumption of determinism is not essential
for the example; as will hopefully be clear, whenever the micro-level chance differs from the macro-level chance, an
example posing a serious problem for the OC can be described.
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It is a matter of trivial calculation that the CF assigns the act A1 higher expected moral
utility than the act A2 if chm is used in the calculation and the act A2 is assigned higher utility
than A1 if chM is used. In other words, one thing is the right thing to do for the agent if OC
uses the micro-level chance, and another thing is the right thing to do if the macro-level chance
is used. In still other words, the agent ought to do one thing under OC using the micro-level
chance, and ought to do another under OC using the macro-level chance: before some choice is
made regarding this matter, OC prescribes the agent conflicting obligations (or no obligation
at all, if we take the CF not to be defined).
The importance of such problems for the prospects of OC depends on how often chance
plurality is displayed in situations involving ethical evaluation. If you believe that it is a
phenomenon only occurring in rigorously controlled and precisely described physical environ-
ments, you will probably not be moved by the fact that on such occasions it makes OC contra-
dictory or silent. However, if you take chance plurality, at least chance duality, to be a common
occurrence, for example because in most if not all examples you can think of the distinction be-
tween the macro- and microlevels is intuitively clear, then you should believe that the issue of
chance plurality is of serious concern to anyone subscribing to OC – just like the reference class
problem is of critical import for anyone employing probability in legal reasoning. Depending
on whether chance plurality is common or not, or if it is indeed ubiquitous, some solutions we
will discuss will also look more or less reasonable.
I suggest that most chancy situations are describable on at least two levels involving laws of
chance. Therefore, I give high credence to the following statement: in many situations in which
an agent chooses between acts at least one of which is compatible with more than one outcome,
and which outcome is eventually realised depends at least partially on chance, chance plurality
is exhibited. Whether this leads to frequent problems for OC depends on how often chances
meaningfully differ between the various levels; however, I give high credence to the statement
that if the fundamental laws are deterministic, and higher-level laws are not, problems for OC
similar to the one just described indeed arise. What can we do about this?
5.1. Digression: examples involving micro- and macro-level indeter-
minism
The Reader will have noticed that all examples of chance-plurality mentioned so far involved
fundamental determinism; this is also the case with the example about John9. This is not a
coincidence—the still relatively sparse literature on level-relative chances contains few, if any,
9 Although, as mentioned, the assumption can be loosened without losing track of the import of the example.
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worked out real-life examples of nondegenerate chance on both the lower and the higher level.
The prevailing opinion is that nothing stands a priori against such an option. Establishing
that a situation displays two non-degenerate chances would require (at least) an argument
that on both levels the six principles proposed by Schaffer are satisfied, which is bound to be
a nontrivial task. I would not like for such examples to play the biggest role in my argument
against theOC, since I would risk that even those otherwise sympathetic to the chance plurality
idea would find them wanting. Still, not to give an impression that chance plurality as posing
difficulties for the OC requires fundamental determinism,10 I propose the following sketches
of two examples which make no similar assumption.
The first case starts with the following example from (List & Pivato, 2015, p. 141): sup-
pose ‘the police in a big city wish to forecast crime rates in various neighborhoods, in order
to organize effective patrols. (. . . ) The police will have to treat patterns of crime as involv-
ing nondegenerate objective chance. The chance of various crimes happening will differ from
neighborhood to neighborhood: there is a higher chance of petty theft and pickpocketing at the
railway station than on a quiet residential street’. Note that this is supposed to hold ’whether
or not there is some physical or neuropsychological level at which each individual crime is pre-
determined’. Choose, then, some appropriate neuropsychological level and assume that the
individual crimes are not predetermined on it, but subscribe to some chancy laws. Suppose
that, on some day, in view of the recent crime-rate increase in the railway station area the
officer in charge of patrol assignment can choose to allocate more officers to that region—or to
send additional officers to a hitherto peaceful residential block. Suppose the neighbourhood-
level objective chance List & Pivato write about indeed assigns a higher chance of crime-related
incidents to the railway station area. On the other hand, the particular configuration of the
city’s residents’ locations and their conditions combined with their chancy laws of individual
crime-related behavior leads, on that particular day, the lower-level chance of criminal inci-
dents to be higher in the residential block in question. It is easy to see how this leads to a case
similar to the one above, involving John, the gambler.
The second idea follows a suggestion of one Reviewer who in the context of the plurality of
chances mentioned currency exchange rates. My example will involve covered interest arbi-
trage (Levinson, 2006, p. 25). The individuals under discussion live in the US; the choice to
be made is whether to buy American, French or British one year bonds. Assume that Steven
has been successful in his ForEx trading endeavours; in fact, he has amassed a small fortune
and has become quite smug about his financial predictive skills. This has infuriated his aunt
Jemima, firm in her belief that such proceedings are a modern form of common thievery, to
10 And following the suggestions of the two anonymous Reviewers.
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no end. It so happens that aunt Jemima dies, making Steven the sole executor of her will. Its
terms—by means of which Jemima wishes to teach Steven a lesson—state that, regarding a
sizable sum of money left by the aunt, on the noon of the day after the will is opened Steven
is supposed to announce his decision whether to invest the whole sum in American, French or
British one-year bonds, while the investment is to be carried out after exactly seven days.
The financial situation on the day Steven is supposed to make his announcement is as fol-
lows: the interest rates in the three countries together with the spot and future exchange rates
dictate that investing in American bonds is clearly the least profitable option, while British
bonds are slightly preferable profit-wise to the French ones. However, since people will be sell-
ing dollars for pounds and Euros, the spot dollar/pound and dollar/Euro rates will decrease,
while the one-year forward rate rate will increase. We can consider the micro-level of de-
scription of the financial market, involving individual buyers and sellers, and the macro-level,
involving larger groups and bodies, on which the Market Forces operate. On the assumption
that both of these levels involve chances, we can consider the situation in which:
• due to the Market Forces in operation (government decisions, bank policies etc.) the
macro-chance of the British bonds ending up as the most profitable option in a week is
higher than the chance that one of the two other options ends up as the most profitable;
• however, due to the particular configuration of individual buyers and sellers, it is the
micro-chance of the French bonds ending up as the most profitable which is the highest
among the three options.
It is hopefully easy to see how one can on that basis construct an example similar to the one
from the last Section.
As already mentioned, I would not like these examples to be the main illustration of my ar-
gument against theOC.My objective in this paper is not to push forward the research on chance
plurality; establishing whether the two examples from this Subsection really ‘work’ would re-
quire e.g. a careful examination of whether we can legitimately speak about probabilistic laws
in the context of economics and neuropsychological basis of human behavior—tasks which are
clearly outside the scope of the current paper. I suggest, therefore, that the Reader keep in his
or her mind the example of John the gambler as the main illustration of my point.
6. The Options
To repeat, we are considering situations in which the CF employed by the objective consequen-
tialism awards some act two different values depending on which objective chance function
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is used. The issue is especially pressing if the act maximises the CF according to one of the
functions (that is, the agent ought to perform it) but does not according to the other (that is,
the agent ought to perform a different, possibly incompatible, act). Assume there are only two
relevant levels to be discussed. We seem to have three families of choices:
1. No answer. We could decide that the question whether an agent ought to perform that
act or not has no answer at all.
2. ’Dideontism’11. Another option would be to, in a way, embrace the conflict and state
outright that it is true that the agent ought to perform the given act and that it is false
that the agent ought to perform the given act. In logic the position that some sentences
are both true and false is called ’dialetheism’ (Priest et al., 2018). We may give this
position in the context of objective consequentialism the name ’dideontism’.
It needs to be noticed that in all situations in which the CF is usually invoked, if an act
does not maximise it, another act does. And so dideontism will make the above claim
about at least two acts: that is, for two acts A1 and A2, it is true that the agent should
perform A1, it is true that the agent should perform A2, it is false that the agent should
perform A1, and it is false that the agent should perform A2. We could add indeterminacy
to this view and say that while it is true that the the agent should perform A1, and it is
true that the agent should perform A2, it is not determinately true that the agent should
perform A1; likewise for A2 (Williams, 2017).
3. One privileged level. We could decide that from the levels of description to which the
objective chance functions are assigned one is singled out as the one which determines
the normative issues. Still, it is conceivable a priori that different levels could be norma-
tively relevant in different situations: sometimes the microphysical one, and sometimes
a higher one. Therefore, the options are:
3.1. (micro) In any situation featuring chance plurality, OC should employ the lower-level
chance.
3.2. (macro) In any situation featuring chance plurality, OC should employ the higher-
level chance.
3.3. (mixed) Which of the chance levels should be used by the OC depends on the details
of the given situation.
11 I would like to thank one of the anonymous Reviewers for suggesting this term. The initial version of the paper
used the term ’diareteism’.
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Option 1 seems wrong, since it is at least a priori natural to suppose that it will usually be
possible to provide, for a given system, two levels of description giving rise to differing chance
functions, making the situation in which an agent ought to act in a specific way too rare a
phenomenon. Among many obvious disadvantages of option 2, apart from seemingly bringing
us closer to the outlandish proposal from the current paper’s motto, one in particular comes
to mind: already before indeterminacy is invoked, we seem to face an outright contradiction
with ’Ought implies Can’. This is because for at least two conflicting acts A and B it is true
that the agent should perform A and it is true that the agent should perform B, but it is
impossible to perform both of these acts. If we claim, in response to this, that for any act it is
not determinately true that the agent should perform it, and if we transfer this indeterminacy to
the level of obligation, we can say that in the cases featuring chance plurality the agent does not
have a determinate obligation to perform any of the given acts. This, however, does not alleviate
the previous issue: while we avoid the contradiction with ’Determinately Ought implies Can’
(since there is nothing the agent determinately ought to do in such cases), the contradiction
mentioned previously remains. This leaves us with option 3. As already mentioned, I believe
it gives those who adhere to OC a way of dealing with the problem; still, perhaps a slight
deviation from purity of its consequentialist aspect is required to hold that what I propose is
indeed a solution.
Note first that neither option 3.1 nor 3.2 should be argued for using the Principal Principle
(PP), even if we accept that by resorting to it we are, as just pointed out, abandoning the conse-
quentialist purity of the position under discussion. We have already mentioned that according
to one of Schaffer’s chance-related principles, chances guide rational credences. Writers are
divided concerning various details concerning the PP (introduced in Lewis, 1986, and widely
considered as a promising candidate for a norm of rationality), but there is a relatively wide
agreement that it is a consistency condition on rational agents, which requires one’s credences
to be coordinated with one’s credences about chances. For example, if Cr is the credence func-
tion of some rational agent (which we assume is a probability measure), if there are two pos-
sible chances for X : .4 and .3, and if that agent’s credences in that each of these is the actual
chance of X are respectively Cr(ch(X ) = .4) = .3 and Cr(ch(X ) = .3) = .7, then the PP says that
Cr(X |ch(X ) = .4) = .4 and Cr(X |ch(X ) = .3) = .3, which allows us to calculate that agent’s ratio-
nal credence in X . Namely, by the law of total probability, Cr(X )= Cr(X |ch(X )= .4)Cr(ch(X )=
.4)+Cr(X |ch(X ) = .3)Cr(ch(X ) = .3) = .4× .3+ .3× .7 = .33. That is, the PP shows how a rational
agent’s credence in X is coordinated with that agent’s credences in what the chances of X are.
PP may do its work even if the information about chance is fundamentally unobtainable, and
can never be learned by anyone: it requires that, say, Cr(X |ch(X )= .4)= .4, even if no one can
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ever learn whether ch(X )= .4 is true12.
It might seem that we could contemplate the move which would have us employ in the CF
that chance function which is used in the PP. This, however, will not help the cause of the OC,
because, due to chance plurality, there is no single function doing the job. Most formulations of
the PPwill inform us about conditional credences of rational agents: credences in a proposition
X conditional on what the chance of X is. Many formulations also include other, ‘admissible’13
propositions among those given which the conditional credence in X is specified. Usually the
formulation one ends up with uses formulas of the sort ‘Cr(X |E∧ ch(X ) = .3) = .3’, where E is
some admissible proposition. Now, for some arbitrarily chosen values of the micro-level chance
function chm and macro-level chance function chM , the PP will only tell us that (for admissible
E’s) Cr(X |E∧ chm(X ) = .3) = 3 and Cr(X |E∧ chM(X ) = .4) = 4. It will be silent when it comes to
the question of the rational value of Cr(X |E∧ chm(X )= .3∧ chM(X )= .4). We would need some
nontrivial additional philosophizing to produce a version of the PP which could handle such
cases. This would require tackling the hairy notion of admissibility and, in particular, whether
propositions about one sort of chance are not inadmissible given propositions about the other
sort of chance. This would take us beyond the scope of the current paper and I would like to
conclude that, as it stands, the PP is of no help to the objective consequentialist.
I do not see an argument for 3.1 or 3.3 which would be worth mentioning. However, in
my opinion there is a route to option 3.2 which is available to the objective consequentialist—
however, it will require abandoning the consequentialist purity of the position, that is, it will
require one to care about more than just maximizing a value function. The route involves the
notion of blame. Let me say at the outset that it will probably be of little interest to those who
subscribe to ’quality of the will’ accounts of blame (see e.g. Strawson, 2013 and Tännsjö, 1995),
or think that the phenomenon of ’blameless wrongdoing’ (Parfit, 1986) is common. As a first
step, observe that we typically blame an agent for an event if she or he was the cause of that
event (Kenner, 1967), or at least among the causes of that event. Then note that if causation
is considered as difference-making (List & Menzies, 2009), it is reasonable to think of it as
a relation involving higher-level properties and entities (for a recent defense of this view see
Fenton-Glynn, 2017); it may then be plausible to claim that higher-level causation involves
higher-level chances. Suppose an agent holding a gun faces a choice whether to shoot someone
or not; the kind Reader is asked to fill the requisite details of the story in her or his favorite
manner, assuming only that the possible victim ought not to be killed. Then if our agent
decides to shoot, and kills, she or he will not be blamed for putting the system consisting of the
gun, bullet and the victim in the precise microphysical state the temporal evolution of which
12 See Bana (2016) for an interesting formal controversy about this point.
13 For an entry point to modern discussion on the issue of admissibility in the context of the PP, see Lewis (1994).
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leads to another state which is among the infinitely many micro-states realising the macro-
state of the victim being killed by a bullet, but will rather be blamed for pulling the trigger.14
The sphere of (micro-)physical possibilities is infinite, while agential possibility (List, 2014) is
coarse-grained, at least for the simple reason that fixing the microphysical state of the relevant
system is outside the agent’s control. If blame presupposes alternate possibilities open to the
agent, then, since these are not found at the micro-level, it is the higher-level chances which
should be of import to moral evaluation.
This does not however give us a bullet-proof solution to our problem; we should not say that
for that simple reason it is the higher-level chances which are of ethical interest and should be
employed by OC. I specifically set up the casino example above so that the choice the agent faces
involves two options; one in which the microphysical state of anything is irrelevant (the agent
takes the previous winnings), and the other, which hangs on the behavior of a system whose
not only macro- but also micro-physical state is fixed – the agent’s choice is not compatible with
many physical possibilities corresponding to various possible states of the dice-rolling tube, but
requires the tube to be used in the state it had been set up.
It seems to me, then, that there are two general, hand-wavy approaches one can take. The
first and preferable one would be to simply say that in general blame-talk is cause-talk, and
since causation involves higher-level propositions, the chance level to be used in the CF should
be the higher one.
The second avenue can be opened by pointing to the fact that knowledge about the micro-
level chances relevant to the given situation is typically unobtainable, while in principle it
should be possible to attain information about the macro-level ones.15 By not maximising
utility according to the CF as employed by the OC the agent displays then either a lack of
in-principle-achievable knowledge or a conscious act against that knowledge. However, the
flaws of such behavior are related primarily to issues of epistemic rationality. That an agent
is epistemically irrational does not necessarily mean that he or she is morally reprehensible.
It is tough to justify the claim that in situations displaying chance plurality the agent has a
moral obligation to possess the knowledge about the higher-level chances.
The first approach seems tome, then, to be themore promising of the two. At this moment it
seems tome that no other solutions present themselves, and even those considered here require
14 Although it might sound weird to say this, our agent might be blamed for putting the system in a microphysical
state which belongs to the set of states the temporal evolution of which lead to states which belong to the set all
elements of which realise the macro-state of the trigger being pulled. But the agent will not be blamed for putting the
system in the microphysical state that actually obtained. I would like to thank one of the Reviewers for pressing me
on that point.
15 I would like to reiterate here that we are talking about objective chances, not epistemic probabilities.
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the proponent of OC to abandon the consequentialist purity of that position, by bringing blame
into the equation. If one is unhappy with both proposals, then I suggest that in view of recent
developments in philosophy of science objective consequentialism should be abandoned.
7. Conclusions
In this paper I identified a problem for Objective Consequentialism generated by chance plu-
rality – on some occasions there is more than one chance function which could be employed
in the consequentialist formula used to calculate the expected moral utility. I have suggested
that if we take into account how the notion of blame is used we can reach the conclusion that
in such cases it is the the higher level chance that should be called upon—this, however, is not
an option available to a pure consequentialist. The general validity of this approach remains
to be seen.
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